Disclosure: This is a long, complicated and quite possibly confused post. Feel free to disagree: I'm not sure I agree with all of it.
Introduction: Objective: To understand why England suck so much ass, using as empirical research the amount of ass that CC sucks when he plays.
1.1. England suck ass
So, England's 50-over ODI side has been giving rise to quite a bit of chatter. The problem seems relatively simple. Alastair Cook has been appointed captain - despite not having been in the team for the World Cup. Many felt, before he was appointed, that he was too pedestrian a player for one day cricket. In the last match he made a compelling case in opposition: a century at just under a run a ball; the kind of knock that allows other people to play their shots around him.
Ah, except there's a problem. The man at number three is Jonathan Trott, who has recently been the player performing that anchor role - batting through the innings at around four an over and then looking to accelerate right at the end. He's done it very well, so he can't be dropped. Now, there are all sorts of conflicting scenarios and schools of thought here. Let's run through some of them:
1) England are in the strange position of hoping that their numbers one and three don't bat together for any great length of time.
2) Following that train of thought - if one of Cook or Trott get out, then the batting line up looks good because you then have an anchor holding the innings together and strokemakers blazing away at the other end.
3) But in the modern era, do we actually want an anchor at all? Some say that the middle order have thrown their wickets away precisely because Trott is making a hundred at the other end. Now Cook's presence has made it worse. If you look at India or Sri Lanka, they do have anchors in the form of Tendulkar and Jayawardene, but they are such classy stroke makers that they can accelerate in a way Trott and Cook can't - brilliant Test players though they are.
4) The opposite school of thought is that you do need an anchor and having two of them is not a problem as long as they understand when the time comes to abandon their role and hit out or get out. 50 overs is a long time to bat. They've received criticism but it's only because Pietersen, Bell and (of late) Morgan have failed to make big scores.
So which of the above is right? In my view, the answer is simple: all of them. It depends on how well they play and how well the bowlers they're facing bowl. A cop out, yes. But bear with me.
This is going to segue into a discussion about me, so apologies. But it has a bearing on the Cook/Trott problem.
1.2. It's all about CC, baby
If I'm opening the innings - assuming there isn't a terrifying run rate requirement - my game plan is simple: leave or block the good ones, hit the bad ones. Usually that means I'm quite stodgy. But there have been times I've gone out and have been going at 8 or 9 an over from the start. There have been many more times I've gone at four or five, and there have also been times I've been going at one or two. The difference is simple - either I've had a greater or lesser number of bad balls to hit, or I've missed out on or capitalised on more or fewer of my scoring opportunities. Regardless of how well I've done it over the years, it's well accepted that block good/hit bad is the right plan for a top order batsman.
As a youth cricketer, I was a number six or seven. Again, I had a simple game plan - try to hit everything, unless it was absolutely on a perfect line or length or seemed to be doing something that made hitting it too risky. Obviously, I got out a lot more - but I also scored at a quicker rate. This was assuming I came in with runs on the board and the field spread. If I came in and we were up against it, I tried to play as I would were I opening.
Cricket, while comprising the performances of individuals, is a team game. You need solidity at the top of the order against the new ball, and you need acceleration later on. That way you can preserve the wickets at the top, thereby ensuring you bat as many overs as possible, and also maximise the run scoring at the bottom. At any kind of decent level averages and performances are somewhat divorced in the one day game. Yes, Trott might average about 30 more than the number 7, but that doesn't make him twice as useful in terms of the game situation. If the guys down the bottom don't hit out, there's no point the guys at the top trying to bat time. You keep wickets in hand because you expect to lose them at a faster rate. So both of these roles are pretty standard for a batting line up. And I'll get on to this later - they're also deceptively similar.
Now a couple of years ago I was struggling for form, so our skipper moved me down the order, to number five. Neither of us could have realised at the time, but it was the worst possible thing he could have done. To my mind, numbers four and five have the toughest jobs in the limited overs game. These players are there to increase the scoring rate, without getting out. It's something that I think requires a natural stroke maker: someone who blocks the good balls but whose mindset is focussed on scoring wherever possible. Slightly less attacking than the role I played at six, considerably more so than the one I played in the top order. It's someone whose natural game is to go at five or six an over. I'm not sure it's something that can be learned.
Certainly I never mastered it. Time and again I found myself in this situation: blocking the first four balls of an over because they were on target, and then pre-meditating a slog because I felt it was my duty to pick up the run rate. The trouble is that pre-meditating attacking shots to good line and length balls is pretty much the best way to lose your wicket in a hurry.
What I should have done, and I know too late now - is not deviate from one of the two batting game plans: either top order Strategy A) block the good ones and hit the bad ones or lower order Strategy B) - if it's possibly there for a shot, hit it. What both strategies have in common is this: you don't try to hit a good ball for four. Technically they are the same: all that's changed is the attitude. A really good player wouldn't differ. Unless he's Chris Gayle or Virender Sehwag - if he gets six perfect balls, especially on the wickets we play on, he plays out six dots. He's just more likely than me to hit the one that's slightly off line or length for four.
Those two game plans, you see, are the only two that work in the long term. I've seen all sorts of mismatches over the years - former professional players clubbing village attacks around - and however easy they're finding it, even the very best players don't deviate from either of those two strategies. They are really two sides of the same coin - one aggressive, one defensive. It's the lack of willing to hit a perfectly pitched delivery that unites them. The only time you start trying to whack ones on off stump through midwicket or wallop good length ones over the bowler's head is at the end of the innings, and even then there's a good case for defending anything on a perfect line and length.
2.1. Strategy Oh Bollocks)
These two strategies differ entirely from the 'block, block, block, shit, time to hit something' - which I'll call 'Strategy Oh Bollocks)', because that's what you usually say shortly after adopting it. It's a quick road to failure, as I learned to my cost.
Back to England. Very broadly - Cook and Trott belong in the top order Strategy A) camp. Kieswetter, Pietersen and Morgan belong in the middle/lower Strategy B) camp. Of course it's more complicated than that. It takes all of them time to play themselves in. Morgan's definition of a ball that might be there to be hit for four is very different to, say Kieswetter's, which is in turn different to Pietersen's. But they share one of two mindsets, both of which are a very natural state. Now I can pick out two problems here:
1. I haven't mentioned Ian Bell. He is naturally in the Strategy A) camp. It's why he's such a good batsman in Tests. But at Number 6 and deeply aware of the run rate requirement, he's increasingly finding himself in the Strategy Oh Bollocks) camp.
2. Of the scenarios I mentioned above, I think the third holds more weight than the others. There's a 'piston' problem in the scoring rates, e.g: Cook and Pietersen are at the crease together. The bowlers are either bowling particularly accurately, or Cook is missing his scoring opportunities and scoring at three an over rather than five. Pietersen's definition of a ball that is there to be hit is increasingly coloured by his awareness of the run rate. He finds himself in the Strategy Oh Bollocks) camp. Or if Pietersen isn't scoring at his usual rate, it's unlikely Cook can step on the gas to compensate, leading to the same problem.
What's the answer to this, then? How do you tell a batsman who naturally plays the ball on its merits that we need to score at six an over without him adopting Strategy Oh Bollocks)? What further complicates this is the tactics for the Powerplay - here we see countless teams, not least England, losing wickets because it absolutely encourages Strategy Oh Bollocks).
2.2. In conclusion
I think the answer is as follows: if you bat for 50 overs and score at 5 an over, you will make 250. That is always defendable, at least. If you score at 5 an over for 40 overs, you have 200. That leaves you 10 overs. If you have a few wickets in hand, 50 is a doddle, but 10 an over from there is not out of the question, giving you the magic 300. So instead of aiming for 300, aim for 100 off 20 and if you don't get there, 200 off 40 as first ports of call.
Look at it that way and suddenly the presence of Trott and Cook doesn't seem such a problem. Even if they batted together for 40 overs and didn't quite get you to 200, there'd be so many wickets in hand that an almighty slog at the end would be more than feasible. And that's without doing anything special in the Powerplays - four an over should be attainable without taking any risks, and though that's hardly explosive, it's certainly better than losing three wickets minimum, which is our usual effort.
I don't think it's beyond this batting line up to make that without losing too many wickets - but I think the problem has been that they've been looking too much towards the finished total, scored at a run a ball. Personally, I would bring in Bopara for Bell, because he has a bit more of the slogger about him and his bowling is useful. But I do think having Cook and Trott in the top order can work. What it really needs is more consistent performances from Kieswetter, who when he does make runs, rarely makes them at anything under 6 an over - that's his natural rate. In the debates about Cook and Trott, the key role of his batting has been forgotten.
Mind you, this is a completely pointless debate. Because we've long picked the wrong team. That's another post, I guess.
Introduction: Objective: To understand why England suck so much ass, using as empirical research the amount of ass that CC sucks when he plays.
1.1. England suck ass
So, England's 50-over ODI side has been giving rise to quite a bit of chatter. The problem seems relatively simple. Alastair Cook has been appointed captain - despite not having been in the team for the World Cup. Many felt, before he was appointed, that he was too pedestrian a player for one day cricket. In the last match he made a compelling case in opposition: a century at just under a run a ball; the kind of knock that allows other people to play their shots around him.
Ah, except there's a problem. The man at number three is Jonathan Trott, who has recently been the player performing that anchor role - batting through the innings at around four an over and then looking to accelerate right at the end. He's done it very well, so he can't be dropped. Now, there are all sorts of conflicting scenarios and schools of thought here. Let's run through some of them:
1) England are in the strange position of hoping that their numbers one and three don't bat together for any great length of time.
2) Following that train of thought - if one of Cook or Trott get out, then the batting line up looks good because you then have an anchor holding the innings together and strokemakers blazing away at the other end.
3) But in the modern era, do we actually want an anchor at all? Some say that the middle order have thrown their wickets away precisely because Trott is making a hundred at the other end. Now Cook's presence has made it worse. If you look at India or Sri Lanka, they do have anchors in the form of Tendulkar and Jayawardene, but they are such classy stroke makers that they can accelerate in a way Trott and Cook can't - brilliant Test players though they are.
4) The opposite school of thought is that you do need an anchor and having two of them is not a problem as long as they understand when the time comes to abandon their role and hit out or get out. 50 overs is a long time to bat. They've received criticism but it's only because Pietersen, Bell and (of late) Morgan have failed to make big scores.
So which of the above is right? In my view, the answer is simple: all of them. It depends on how well they play and how well the bowlers they're facing bowl. A cop out, yes. But bear with me.
This is going to segue into a discussion about me, so apologies. But it has a bearing on the Cook/Trott problem.
1.2. It's all about CC, baby
If I'm opening the innings - assuming there isn't a terrifying run rate requirement - my game plan is simple: leave or block the good ones, hit the bad ones. Usually that means I'm quite stodgy. But there have been times I've gone out and have been going at 8 or 9 an over from the start. There have been many more times I've gone at four or five, and there have also been times I've been going at one or two. The difference is simple - either I've had a greater or lesser number of bad balls to hit, or I've missed out on or capitalised on more or fewer of my scoring opportunities. Regardless of how well I've done it over the years, it's well accepted that block good/hit bad is the right plan for a top order batsman.
As a youth cricketer, I was a number six or seven. Again, I had a simple game plan - try to hit everything, unless it was absolutely on a perfect line or length or seemed to be doing something that made hitting it too risky. Obviously, I got out a lot more - but I also scored at a quicker rate. This was assuming I came in with runs on the board and the field spread. If I came in and we were up against it, I tried to play as I would were I opening.
Cricket, while comprising the performances of individuals, is a team game. You need solidity at the top of the order against the new ball, and you need acceleration later on. That way you can preserve the wickets at the top, thereby ensuring you bat as many overs as possible, and also maximise the run scoring at the bottom. At any kind of decent level averages and performances are somewhat divorced in the one day game. Yes, Trott might average about 30 more than the number 7, but that doesn't make him twice as useful in terms of the game situation. If the guys down the bottom don't hit out, there's no point the guys at the top trying to bat time. You keep wickets in hand because you expect to lose them at a faster rate. So both of these roles are pretty standard for a batting line up. And I'll get on to this later - they're also deceptively similar.
Now a couple of years ago I was struggling for form, so our skipper moved me down the order, to number five. Neither of us could have realised at the time, but it was the worst possible thing he could have done. To my mind, numbers four and five have the toughest jobs in the limited overs game. These players are there to increase the scoring rate, without getting out. It's something that I think requires a natural stroke maker: someone who blocks the good balls but whose mindset is focussed on scoring wherever possible. Slightly less attacking than the role I played at six, considerably more so than the one I played in the top order. It's someone whose natural game is to go at five or six an over. I'm not sure it's something that can be learned.
Certainly I never mastered it. Time and again I found myself in this situation: blocking the first four balls of an over because they were on target, and then pre-meditating a slog because I felt it was my duty to pick up the run rate. The trouble is that pre-meditating attacking shots to good line and length balls is pretty much the best way to lose your wicket in a hurry.
What I should have done, and I know too late now - is not deviate from one of the two batting game plans: either top order Strategy A) block the good ones and hit the bad ones or lower order Strategy B) - if it's possibly there for a shot, hit it. What both strategies have in common is this: you don't try to hit a good ball for four. Technically they are the same: all that's changed is the attitude. A really good player wouldn't differ. Unless he's Chris Gayle or Virender Sehwag - if he gets six perfect balls, especially on the wickets we play on, he plays out six dots. He's just more likely than me to hit the one that's slightly off line or length for four.
Those two game plans, you see, are the only two that work in the long term. I've seen all sorts of mismatches over the years - former professional players clubbing village attacks around - and however easy they're finding it, even the very best players don't deviate from either of those two strategies. They are really two sides of the same coin - one aggressive, one defensive. It's the lack of willing to hit a perfectly pitched delivery that unites them. The only time you start trying to whack ones on off stump through midwicket or wallop good length ones over the bowler's head is at the end of the innings, and even then there's a good case for defending anything on a perfect line and length.
2.1. Strategy Oh Bollocks)
These two strategies differ entirely from the 'block, block, block, shit, time to hit something' - which I'll call 'Strategy Oh Bollocks)', because that's what you usually say shortly after adopting it. It's a quick road to failure, as I learned to my cost.
Back to England. Very broadly - Cook and Trott belong in the top order Strategy A) camp. Kieswetter, Pietersen and Morgan belong in the middle/lower Strategy B) camp. Of course it's more complicated than that. It takes all of them time to play themselves in. Morgan's definition of a ball that might be there to be hit for four is very different to, say Kieswetter's, which is in turn different to Pietersen's. But they share one of two mindsets, both of which are a very natural state. Now I can pick out two problems here:
1. I haven't mentioned Ian Bell. He is naturally in the Strategy A) camp. It's why he's such a good batsman in Tests. But at Number 6 and deeply aware of the run rate requirement, he's increasingly finding himself in the Strategy Oh Bollocks) camp.
2. Of the scenarios I mentioned above, I think the third holds more weight than the others. There's a 'piston' problem in the scoring rates, e.g: Cook and Pietersen are at the crease together. The bowlers are either bowling particularly accurately, or Cook is missing his scoring opportunities and scoring at three an over rather than five. Pietersen's definition of a ball that is there to be hit is increasingly coloured by his awareness of the run rate. He finds himself in the Strategy Oh Bollocks) camp. Or if Pietersen isn't scoring at his usual rate, it's unlikely Cook can step on the gas to compensate, leading to the same problem.
What's the answer to this, then? How do you tell a batsman who naturally plays the ball on its merits that we need to score at six an over without him adopting Strategy Oh Bollocks)? What further complicates this is the tactics for the Powerplay - here we see countless teams, not least England, losing wickets because it absolutely encourages Strategy Oh Bollocks).
2.2. In conclusion
I think the answer is as follows: if you bat for 50 overs and score at 5 an over, you will make 250. That is always defendable, at least. If you score at 5 an over for 40 overs, you have 200. That leaves you 10 overs. If you have a few wickets in hand, 50 is a doddle, but 10 an over from there is not out of the question, giving you the magic 300. So instead of aiming for 300, aim for 100 off 20 and if you don't get there, 200 off 40 as first ports of call.
Look at it that way and suddenly the presence of Trott and Cook doesn't seem such a problem. Even if they batted together for 40 overs and didn't quite get you to 200, there'd be so many wickets in hand that an almighty slog at the end would be more than feasible. And that's without doing anything special in the Powerplays - four an over should be attainable without taking any risks, and though that's hardly explosive, it's certainly better than losing three wickets minimum, which is our usual effort.
I don't think it's beyond this batting line up to make that without losing too many wickets - but I think the problem has been that they've been looking too much towards the finished total, scored at a run a ball. Personally, I would bring in Bopara for Bell, because he has a bit more of the slogger about him and his bowling is useful. But I do think having Cook and Trott in the top order can work. What it really needs is more consistent performances from Kieswetter, who when he does make runs, rarely makes them at anything under 6 an over - that's his natural rate. In the debates about Cook and Trott, the key role of his batting has been forgotten.
Mind you, this is a completely pointless debate. Because we've long picked the wrong team. That's another post, I guess.
Trott cannot be dropped: his numbers are too good.
ReplyDeleteOne solution to the Cook plus Trott problem - currently unfashionable at international level - would be to have a floating 3/4/6.
i.e. If Kieswetter goes early, KP or Bell come in ahead of Trott.
The downside is that we may find Trott coming in at 6 with 10 overs to go, but the chances are we will be c. 250-4 and with Bresnan/Swann behind him this shouldn't be an issue.
I'd suggest the possibility of Trott coming in at 6 with 10 overs to go would be the very worst of all worlds. The bottom line is that Bell, Trott and Cook into a 50 over batting order doesn't go. Cook is young and if he develops his odi batting in the way Strauss did you could just about have two of them.
ReplyDeleteUnder my suggested strategy Trott would only come in at 6 if Cook had just batted for c. 40 overs (likely to mean England are in a strong position).
ReplyDeleteElsewise, he would come in when Cook is dismissed and play his natural game.
I'm convinced Trott could whack it during the last 10 overs: CC, you are often pidgeonholed as a blocker/accumulator but as we both know, you can whack it when the situation demands. I suspect it is the same with Trott (and recall a couple of examples of Warwickshire innings where he did so).
And if he can't, send Bresnan or Swann in who are naturally very agressive.
I'm not convinced. Not really. Trott rarely, if ever, hits sixes. You need an Afridi/Razzaq/Cameron White type of player coming in at that stage. To my mind Bopara, Wright or Patel are all more likely to whack it out the park. They're also more likely to get out, but in the situation you describe that's less of an issue.
ReplyDelete